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ABSTRACT 
This study  investigates  the impact  of  union organization  on  the  wages and 
labor practices  of establishments  newly  organized  in the 1980s  using a  research 
design  in  which establishments  are  'paired'  with their closest  nonunion 
competitor.  There are two major  findings.  First,  unionism  had only a  modest 
effect  on  wages in the newly organized  plants.  which contrasts  sharply  with the 
huge union wage impact  found in  cross.settion  comparisons  of union and  nonunion 
individuals  on Current  population  Suey  and related  data tapes.  Second,  in 
contrast  to its modest  impact  on  wages,  new  unionization  substantially  altered 
several  personnel  practices.  creating  grievance  systems.  greater seniority 
protection.  and  job bidding  and  posting.  That  newly organized  establishments 
adopt union working  conditions  but grant  only modest  increases  in  wages 
suggests  that 'collective  voice' rather  than monopoly  wage gains is the key to 
understanding  what unionism  does in  the economy. 
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•i Intact of New Unionization on Waqes ard WorkirrditiOr 
_prnit.iinal  StLxv of Estab1islsnts Urer NIRB Elections 
st.ies of the ecxnanic effects of unionization have traditionally 
focusa on differerceS  between union ard r  urLion workers  (Freatlan ard 
ioff, 1984,  Lewis 1986),  in large part because of the availability of 
crcss—section  ari 1oritJnal  data sets on iriividuals.  Because unions 
have had little organizirg suoess in the 1970s ard 1980s, hci.ever, the the 
vast majority of union workers in sucth data sets are elTployei in 
estab1islfltS that were organiza decades earlier, ard thus may present a 
xnisleadirq picthre of the arxtiic effects of the --  union organization 
that might be expect&i to thf1uer the decisis of orrently ruiion 
manageirent ard workers to surcort or cççc6e  union organizirg drives.  In a 
peric when union wage ixreases have fallen short of those of xminiCfl 
workers,1 ard the union share of amçlcyxrent  has cntractad, the iripact of 
newly organized unior on wages ard workir rditions can reasonably be 
expectrd to differ fron that of existirg unions. 
at  has be the &xmixziiic  inçmact of s.xxessful  union organizir drives 
in the  1980s?  Has z  unionization rais&1 wages suItantiallY or altered 
workiri citia  greatly in the pericd?  To arwer these questions, 
in 1986 we surveyed 203  establishmarmts that had National Lahor Relations 
Board electi in the 1980s, ard 161  'crrxtro1' firm who did rt  faoa union 
orgaiuz1r drives.  By foczsirg on establis1mntS  rather than workers,  ard 
by usin3 a before/after researth desit, we are able to examine what rt 
unionization  did to wages ard terf  its, personnel practi, ard atploynent. 2 
Thus, 'a are able to eatirrata the 'trargiral' nther than avenge effects of 
unionization  in the peri. 
Cur principal fL-ñiag is that in the 1980s rw unionisation pro±c 
wage and teref it gaire far tela those inpli b  standard aces-section 
analyses of union wage effects.  At the sane tine 'a find that realy 
organiand workers cede sigeificant gains in the areas of grievance 
procedures,  job posting and bidoirn, arcS  seniority protect  ion.  Cbnsistent 
with a sniest effect of raw unionisu on wages,  anrw'er, 'a find laer 
growth of Fsrploylrent in rawly unionised establisS-ments  than in air central 
qraip of estab1is-mrints,  ?thile 'a are canrnt deter-mire with any certainty 
the extent to WSilCth the relatively weak union inçact on wages in air sançie 
is due to the eccnarjc corditions of the l980s  (a 'paricd'  effect), the 
pattern of gein  in first contracts (an  'age' effect), or the specifio 
d.aracterjstics of establis￿-urents  that 'are organizef in the period  (a 
"vintage'  effect), air results dSonstrate that ore cartrnt extrapelate 
extant estimates of uniorVrxnjnion  wage differences to rawly organized 
establisS-greorts,  That rawly unionized plants ad<t standard union working 
corditiore sajests,  Iroreaver,  that the industrial jurispredence  (Slici-iter, 
Italy and  Livernash)  or collective voice  (Frran and )tff) rather than 
the na'ly face of  nionisit is the easer of the institution. 
St present the evidence arcS argsents for these claire in three parts 
In section era 'a desorite air survey nethedolony, a 'seni—experinental' 
desiga that inrolven paired cerparisore of establishments to control for 
unobserved differences tetween 1finra that face/do not face union organizing 
drives,  In the secxrd tion 'a give air basic estimates of what rev union 
organization does to wage arcS perscnel practices,  In section three 'a 3 
prthe the results for utric  prthl ard disc' altemative 
thterpretatia of the firdirs. 
I.  Issues ard ?thcdolcv 
Starxiard  analyses of the union wage prnitnn in the United States 
estinte that the wages of union workers  exceed te  of ncrainicn workers  in 
crcas—section  data by 15 to 25  (1is, 1986) ard that the wages of 
workers  who switd union status in 1critñir%al data is ax*it 10 percent 
higher in the union status  (Fran, 1985; Lewis,  1986).  Neither of these 
estiimtes, hver, is likely to gage arately the inçact of unionism  on 
the wages of establislnrents organized in the 1980s,  ard thus the wage cests 
(to fints)  ard benefits  (to workers)  of sucressful orgariizirq drives. 
Because unions have organized few workplaces  in the past two decades, 
estirates of union effects based on crs-section data essentially itrast 
workers  in fin organized years  ago (in the 1970s ard 1960s or earlier)  to 
workers  in other firns while estimates based on lcrgiti.iii.nal  data ctrast 
workers who d-iarqe union status by ncvirg to or fran already organized 
workp1ac rather than workers in plants that are rawly organized versus 
thcee in plants that renain nonunion. 
re  are three reasa for e ptirg  the unic  effects of n  union 
organizatian  in the 1980s to differ fran the wage differei between workers 
in already existirg union aril nonunion workplaces.  First is the unfavorable 
ecorK.lnC  envircruint of the peried: the delis in union representation, 
derulatian of irdustries, inoreased foreign cxçetition,  ard hii 
urtçloysnt that are likely to have raised the elasticity of labor denard 
facir rily organized labor ard thus to have red  the ability of the 
unions to raise wages2  In an envircnrtent in wtiith marrj existir unions 4 
1red  their precthzn over rxrrunicri labor,  it is plausible to e'çet that 
new unions feral a rtiailarly diffiojlt task of establithirq preniirn in 
the first instarcs,3 
She, union iirçacts on rewly organizel nrkers are likely to differ 
f  run those on previoisiy organized eorkers because first ctntracts are 
likely to prdan different cxitronas than later contracts,  as has been 
recngnizei sirce the days of Paul g1as, if riot earlier.  In his 1930 book 
on real wages in the U.S.  tnlas argued that unions poshid. for esiaIly 
large wage gains in their first caitract presurably to strengthen  the 
loyalty of the newly organized workers,  aid that after the first contract, 
union wages would increase  at about the sara rate as nonunion wages: 
"Unionisn, in other wools, very predably does give an arcciab1e increase 
in earnings during the early ngriol of effective organization, but during 
the later aol rrore nature years of union davalsent  the relative rate of 
thither progress seers  to he no onre rapid on the whole for unionists than 
fur rea-r0000rusts. {irnolao.  0.  564)  Other analysts, bc.wver,  argue the 
Si - it  u-< are  err cc cameo  r noes fran  — tr jfl  -r  .ecur t 
provisicos like dues checkoffs  in their first contract. producing snaIl wage 
gains with first contracts,  La the education sector,  where collective 
bargaining is a relatively nrcent pheratenon, the evidence suggests that 
teacher unions obtained only modest wage gains in first contracts (Freerren 
1986)  Pewter, ti-at siteation could differ in the private sector, 
A third reason for expecting differences in union effects between 
existing ard newly organized plants are vintage effects &ce to the distinct 
rtharaoteristicrs of establishnents or workers  organized in the 198th cerpared 
to ti-see organized earlier.  Its infreepercy of organizat  ion in the  198th 5 
suests, in partia.lar, that rly  organized plants re  likely to have 
different tharacterizti than other plants.  Labor/nagnt relations ay 
have teen partio1arly poor in the plants that beca union, makir rkers 
favorable to unions, or managrent y  have n  less cçposed to 
unions in thcGe plants than elsewhere, pcssibly because they did rt foresee 
sericus  rziic lcses u*i becziairg unionized.  Amther potential cause of 
vintage effects is that workers sçxrtir unions in the 1980s terd to be 
disprcrtionately mirxrity or fnale cx*ipared to the white males  who 
organized decades earlier. 
(Xir Leta Set 
As data  sets like the Q.irrerit PcpJlation Suxvey  (C) aid National 
Labor Relations Bcard administrative raxrds do not provide infornetion on 
eiunic danjes associated with ne. union ozganization, we developed a ne. 
establishrrent-based data set to estimate the inpact of ni unionization  in 
the 1980s.  We  d velc:i cur data thrgh a three-step procedure. 
First, we cbtained fran the Boston aid Kansas City National  Labor 
Relations Board districts r&xrds of establishirents that had elections 
during the 1980s.  The states covered by the t  districts are generally 
reflective of the national labor relations envLrcmnnnt.  A cxposite rankii 
of private su±or unicr density in the states in cur saxiple was 29th cut of 
51  (D.C. inoled). " 
Secxn:I,  we cxniucted 203 on-site intezviews with firn that had 
elections with over 20 tp1oyees in the bargaining unit.  Of the 243 finrs 
we oontacted,  203 agreed to talk to us, for a response rate of 83.5 percent: 
100  were in Bctcn aid 103  were in Kansas City; 5 percent had elections in 
1985;  31 percent in 1984; 12 percent in  1983;  10 percent in 1982;  16 percent 6 
in 1981;  16 parctrit in 1980  and 10 percent in 1979.  In air original sairple 
8.4  ercsrrt sent cut of tusiress or tried,  To s  if tj'j was an abrcrcelly 
hii or  1cM rats, se detennined the states of fifty reninion "cxrçetitor 
establisl'rrents"  that had or organizing drive  the 1980s ant faint that 
6.5 percent went art of tusiness or rriat  The win rate of unions in the 
tint elections in cur sarple was, anreciver,  virthajdy i&ntioal to the 
rain  oral average: unions won 39 percent of the elect  ions in air sarple 
ccxrrpared to a  38 percent  win rate for all elections contacted in 1981 with 
over 20 cerplcyees  (Thiedoff,  1984).  The proportion  of fins wtio lost 
eiecrciorn erd  sic4resf colccccfre contracts  was also at the national average: 
64 oercent of  elections won  icy unions in air eargie prcduced  signed 
collective contracts  this cxrearen with the 63 percent repznted try !'tt,crnld 
for the pericd l%79in2 (McDonald,  1983), 
Third.  we obtained data for a 'txntrob' graip of rrninicn 
accatlitents that did rot experierna organizing drives during the  1980s, 
Aconiccag cot. :'nnagorc  in the 2 icon tort ccgerierceci orgarci  ring drrves had 
cccvi  infoccnatico  aScot clcse ccrrneti tcrc-,  we asked, then to race their two 
clceve'ct rcnunion crsacetithrs  in their region,  and  inrterviesxzd those fins, 
Mc had  lens succeen in obtaining ocoreratico  in this part of air straty: we 
tnleçigre:i 362  ctr,paoies arid cbtaired 161 pairs  for a resporne rate of 44aS 
icercerdi  leaver, oven with this response rate,  we s-till ceded up with 
ratctied  ocrpaztitozs for auproxisrately  80% of the establistrents that had 
organizing drives, 
We  use our earple of control establisi'orants to sealuate the effects of 
rice uvaica orcanloeticn  en eccrvraic cutccras  in two ways:  1)  by contrast  irg 
charcien in wa-crnn/çetrscrvxel practices in fins that faced organizing drives 7 
with all f1z that did rct; ard 2)  by azçarirg firm that fa  drives 
with their 'c1est tçetitor' ard analyziri  the pairal differen. 
paired cxrrparisons  provide a tential1y useful.  way to ritro1 for saxrple 
selection or ur±etveI variable prthlts by allii  us to trast 
estab1ishints facirz3 organizirq drives with 'brother'  establis  rIts rather 
than with firm in gerral.  If the pair onrrectly give us sets of 
establisurnts that are trore alike than other establishunts in c'.ir saple, 
the variar of wages ard t:enef  its (other variables) betn pairs prior to 
the organizir drive shild be lcMer than the variai between rardatly 
selectrd establishrents.  This is because the rrron ccuçxnerit of the 
variation betn  pairs is reirove by differerirxj.  Fornally,  let var 
(in W./W.)  be the variax in in wages ard terf  its (other variables) 
between pairel establisftrnts ard let v(in W,  in W)  be the covariame 
between then  to o:xiron cxrçonent.  Then,  siixe var(ln W/W) 
= var in W 
+ var in W - 2 cov(in W,  irM). var(in W/W)  <var in  + var in  when 
coy> 0 due to a ituon cxzxçonent.  In cr sanpie the relevant variar 
were var in W.  =  .022; var in W 
=  .019; var  (in W1/W) 
=  .024.  Her, the 
tedriique does  izx3.ee reluce urrtev  differerces anori firt. 
Before turnirq to r  tpirica1 analysis, three akiitical pDints on 
the data.  First, rx,te that althch the san,1e is lirnita to 364 
establisnts, tIe facirq organizir drives içloy over 64,000 werkers, 
while the itro1 saitple loy1 an aãlitical 82,000 werkers, so that we 
are dealir with sizeable ritnrbers of rkers.  Sd, while the data lacks 
informatici ai werker ctharacteristi corxtair a  CPS  typa surveys,  cur 
nasures of estab1isnt ctharacteristi  aid paired .xzrparisons are likely 
to cxntro1 for a significant prcportion of the variar in wages due to 8 
dlfferers arcrn jots: recent analysis of wages on establi&ment  and werker 
d-aracteristica  finds that establ  isThient d'aracteristica acnsit for at 
least as nr±c of the variar in wages as personal  (lunran capital) 
d-rccterrstica  (Groehen,  1986)  mind,  by cbtainirg wage  and other data on 
ash5 lirteertos before as well as after the union orcanizating drive, we 
thffererce away persistent urnreasured ctaracteristics of work forces arcrq 
estaiñ  ishrents. 
IL Urirical Pesuits 
In this section we present estiretes of the impact of rei union 
ogeaniration  cc wages, personrel practices,  and €npioyoent, first by 
crurarirtg ecatahiihrrents that faced organizirg drives to all erpetitor 
establishments ard then by ccenaririg them to their paired 'clceest 
crarretitors' 
Cur first set of wage  estimates are based on the follmeirq in wage 
ecuation: 
{l)D1nWi=aUl+bY2+W3±dZ+eirMere  1  1  1  01  t 
un  is the cage otiarrye at the itt atbolishnrnt fran ore gear 
before the NUB election to t periods after the election or,  for 
establisisenta that did ret have an organirige drive  ,  to t years after their 
pair faced a drive5 
UI, 172.  U) are <draw variables ref  lasting the catrrna of the organirirg 
drive: vt,ether it reenitad in a union victory in the NURB  election and a 
ooliective contract  (Ui=i); a union victory with re contract  (U2=l);  or a 
coricor defeat (U3=l)  Sires doerican unions rely almost exclusively  on 
sigred collective contracts to affect outcomes,  we forms  on the set  meted 
coefficients on the UI demur variable. 9 
Z  is a set of itrol variables, irltir  a d.miny variable for the 
NLRB  district of the firm  (Ecstcn or Kansas City); dimrj variables for year 
of the election, to alli time effects; aix! a dtmty variable for whether the 
workers  were prcdt.ticn or x  prhtion ploy. 
in  is the wage at the ith establis-nnt 1 year before the 
oranizi drive for establishments facir drives, aix! in the same year as 
the relevant pair for the with.rt a drive.6 
uit is the error tern 
air estimates using pairi ccxrarisons are basel on the follir 
&juation: 
(2)  Din  (W./W.)t = aUl +W2 +dJ3  + dTh  (W/W)o 
+ U1,  wbere  is the 
wage in the establisnt facing an organizirg  drive ard  is the wage in 
its pair;  aix! in /W)  is the differential  between the pairs  year 
before the election. 
Table 1 presents the results of cur analysis of diarqes in cxzmpensation 
(wages plus benefits as reçcrtod to cur intariiewers)  for the  frcn 
one year before to one year after the election  aix! frcxn one year before to 
the .irrent pericd for establishments  facirq organiziig  drives aix! cur 
trols.  Buse s  establishments did rit rort wages ard benefits for 
all of these periods, cur saiiple  falls short of the full 364  by nearly a 
third.  The tulk of the missing csexvatior result frc the absejxe of 
figures on wages  ard benefits prior to the oxxjanizirq drive.  the basis 
of rtxh1y similar wage ard benefit levels for establishments that gave 
o1ete figures aix! t1-e that did rxt for the figures that were given by 
the latter establishments, we do rt  believe this data prthlen biases cur 
results. 10 
Turning to the figures,  coltrrs 1-3 record sean levels of peration 
in crir)starTt  1977 'llars for an establishrent ore year before tte election, 
ore year after the election, ard at the tire of the survey or, in the case 
of establisirrents that did rc't have orgenizirg drives, the wages at the tis 
ore year before ard one year after their 'pair' face5 drives, ard at the 
tire of the survey.  The rears for one year before s&w that estab1i.thnts 
that faced drives had slightly lar persat  ion than those that did rct, 
with plants that erdel up with contracts havim  2.9% laer pay than plants 
that did ret face an onganizirg drive.  The post election pericd wears  show 
a different pattern, with pay higher in plants that faced drives, as nild 
be expected given a direct union wage effect and potential threat effects on 
plants facirq drives,  1urrs 4 ard  5 present regression estinstes of the 
inpact of organizing drive cutcxres on diarsges  in wages using iation 1, 
with the diverse factors &scriied there held fixef,  fl'e calailatin sk 
that workers in establithrrents  that gairel a contract had zodest bit 
statistically significantly greater ircreases in pay than workers  in control 
establisirrents, taco .03 to .04  In points.  hey also show that pay rose 
slightly bit irsignificantly sore in plants where the union  the election 
bit failed to gain a contract than in the controls and rose sciwhat sore in 
establisirreits where the union lost the elation, in this case by 
statistically  significant arcunts fraa one panel before to the current 
Ore possible interpretation of the greater ircrease in wages in 
establitents that fa  drives than in the itrols is that they raised 
pay to deter furthur ortnizirq efforts, as predicted by iels of union 
threat or ilIier  effects.  Note also that the differentials  between 
establisirrents ti-at faced ard did not face or'pnizirg drives rose fron ore 11 
year after the election to the tise of the xvey, sugestirq greater direct 
ari spillover effects of unionism as tine prcxs.  In rx se, hcy.ever, 
dc the estinatal union—induci  prenium arroad anvthirø li3ce the stariiard 
union waqe  estimates  of  15 to 25 pernt. 
In ac1ition to the calc.ilati in the table,  we also estiita  several 
other econartric  pecificatior of equation 1.  In one  pecificaticn we 
instniinerrt the base  cxreration in eqmation  1 on the base pe.ricxl 
oiiçensation in a different pericx 8  In arther sçification  we weightai 
c±eervat  ions by riurrbers of rkers in an estab1ishnt.  The results in all 
these eqr  nnts cnrrcborat1 the firdirs reported in table 1. 
paired CTD  cisons 
Table 2  presents  c*.ir estimates of the differerxe between diames in 
xzrçration in establishirnts ar their pair.  1ise 1 ard 2 rerd the 
seen of the differerxs between the in tharges in tperation in an 
establishnent urxergoir an organizirq drive ard in its pair over the 
sFified pericxl.  They confixm the greater irxrease in cixensation in 
establishsents in 'thidi the union wirE an election ard gains a contract 
fcurd in table 1; reveal slitly naller than in pay in establishixnts 
in thidi tmi  win bt fail to gain a itract  than in their pairs; ard  s  nestly higher d,ares in crpensation in establishnents in which the 
union leses the election than in their pairs.  Finally, coherE 3  ard 4 
record the rression coeffcients for the effects of the varims organizir 
c*its fran egation 2.  In these calclatia we anitted the czrEtant 
term fran the reressicn, so that the coefficients on the oranizir drive 
category variables reflect the differez in pay  between establishnents ard 
their pair in a given  category (ciitional on the year of the election ard 12 
the differential  cm year hefore the eltia-i).  For estab1isnts where 
the unicri sr a cnitract the estimates stcj greater wage ircreases than in 
their pain finn cm year prior to the airrerit pericd bit mt fran cm year 
prior to cm year after; for establishannts where unicm ni eleticm bit 
were uneble to gain contracts the estimates s1x* nlible lanses in pay 
relative to the pair; while for establislurents where the unicn lest the 
electicn, the rerjressicra show irereases in cxzrpenaticr relative to their 
pair frm ore year tefore  to the an-rent  paricxl bit not to one  year aften 
The prirary differerce hetwean these results ard these in table I is the 
greator irdicetion that plants that faced onanizirç drives obtained larger 
wage gains as tlire prcceei&.  Still,  the key firdirq ream ins: the estirrateci 
union effects on wages in ready organized plants  fall short of these 
obtained fran Cr5 ard other cross satiai data sets, irditix that cm  jjj  extrapalate those estirretes to the margin of r'ly ornize1 
wer)pla. 
Personnel Practices 
in acklitice to cbtainirq wage anti kenef  its information fran 
establislmants that faceti organizirg drives ant their camtitors, we alse 
asked whether firma intrczt, elinirated, or left urctargcd a diverse set 
of person-el practices, rarigirq fros frirge benefits to seniority 
to grieiamn arbitration to profit sharing.  Pa the resprses showed that 
fins either introduced or left urcharged all practicm exont for profit 
sharing plan, tdx they either eliminatel or left trcharg, we coded the 
variables as 0-1 didiotceries, with 0 reflecting the urchargal catrgory ard 1 
reflecting a charge for all practi save profit-sharirg,  where we used the 
o to reflect the dacrease in profit—sharirg aM I to reflect maintainirg  a 13 
plan.  We usai a lcgistic ftntion to estimate the ixipact  of the onizir 
drive cutcis: 
(3)  Pi=l/[l+e- 
where  is the prthabiity of intr  iz'elimistir a practice; ar 
the catril  ard ccntrol variables are as before. 
Thble  3 presents air analysis of the efft of the union orard.zir 
drives on the fair  practices that we faird were  iiipacta:1 by new 
unionisation.  For eath practice lurm 1 ard 2 rBxrd the prevalerce of 
the practice ore year before ard one year after the organizir drive; celiziu 
3 gives the diare in the prevalei of the practice while column 4 
contrasts the thar*3e betwn the organizirs  establishmants and their paired 
controls; finally, colis 5 presents estimated listic efficients for 
uation 3.  Consistent with crces-secticn analyses of the effect of 
unionin on fringe benefits  (Freeman, 1981),  the results sh, that union 
contracts significantly irxrease the prevaleix of formal grievar 
prccedures, written seniority system for pruxtions or layoff and recalls, 
and written pcsting of prrctior —  practices  that are generally  vieved as 
part of the 'industrial  juripnxere' (Slitthter,  Iea1y and  Livernash,  1960) 
or 'collective voice' (Fran and Mff,  1984)  face of unionism — while 
reducii the prevalere of profit sarirq plans.  In aition to the 
personnel practices in table 3 we also examined the effect of ne. unionisn 
on several other practic —  written sickleave,  funeral leave, pensions, 
military/jury duty pay — and faird ixxest insignificant union inpacts. 
All told,  we viei the firiiir of significant union effects on 
industrial jurisprience/voice personnel practices in the aheer of large 
wage effects as supportirq the inxrtai of the voice face of unionism. 14 
tvlcyttent 
'fl-e extent to tet ne unlcthsation is assiatai with retrtiae in 
eitçloyrrent at the establisftrent level proiid a  otential d-szk en cur wage 
ard tenef it firxtirgs aid sate irsiit into the issue of wtetker inlets 
rotiate mncly wage gaire or efficient contncts,  In general,  extant 
researeti has i-ct farrd sitantial union arployrrent  effects with irdustry or 
state eriployrrant data, a1tha4s arplcynent has shifted away frau unlailsel 
sectors and states  Ore interpretation of these aggragate results is that 
leases of arploynent asscciated with unlonias tray he balax by gains to 
cnrçetirrg nenunice fins.  Zrcther is that unions negotiate sufficient jet 
security previsions to prcdoea efficient crntracts that do net rite 
arpleyrrant helev cirpetitive levels.  Anether is that ti-a reseanth designs 
fail to capture 'nice arplcrynent effects that cxxurrai sEen unics-s first 
established their wage prania. 
lIe evidence fron air survey, based as darges in establtthnent 
arployrrent fran the tiirr of the NIPB election to the current canal, present 
a different picture of the relation between rrtiasisaticn and  arployrrerrt than 
that faint in irare aggregated data  Pa can he sesn in coltras I of table 4, 
cur data slat that while arployrent  grew in cxntrol establisisents,  ti-rae 
that fared organizmrq drives hal either ic ircrease In erployaenrt or had 
redirtiore in esployrsest  ('tere tinione won the election bit cnild twit get a 
cántraot  Ctiutns 2 ccnftrzrs this result with a regressice analysis that 
artrols for regicn, tither wor5cers are prcdsrtlcn workers or net, tIe year 
the election was held,  etcY 
Wiile sore nay wish to interpret these results as IndicatIng that new 
uniomsatice and 'anion orgarizieg drives retire aiplcyrrent free wi-at it 15 
might otherwise be, we sgest caution dt to the fact that iployririt 
decreas ut, aheolutely ard relatively,  in estab1isrxts where the union 
the eltion bt c.ild n't gain a antract,  If union-irilucei wage gains 
were the main factor tir  the slcr grth of xç1'irxt in the 
estab11sbants that fad drives, c*ares in  sild have been 
least where the union gaines czntracts, rt where they failed to gain 
contracts: after all, table 1 shoved that wages iixreased less rapidly  in 
the union wins, r  contract category. It is psibility that cor data are 
pickir  a relation between eiployuent patter ard the lcc.s of 
organizis activity,  rather than the efffxt of colletive bargainir on 
erpoysnt: fii  exçriencirq drrs in p1Oynt  may have the tys of  prl  that lead .orkers to seek union prottion. 
Unfortunately we lack lrent figures over a lczer period or other data 
to prc the ctserved relation.  At the least, hcever,  cir analysis ss 
that establishmant cxxparisct,  unlike arate  analyses,  s  that 
finx that were organized had slcr eploymant grovth than xzarison 
finrs, whid sests that future analysis of union loyuent effts fs 
on rawly organized establishixnts rather than aggregate data. 
$tjon III &utric Prthez ard Intereretatii 
To what extent can cor results can be generalized beyord the saxrles 
stiied?  Given that we could not coeduct a cxntrolled rarxkn assigrnrnt 
experinent, xi a1icable are our estimated imdest wage effts for other 
establishirts in the 1980s?  Nov irrportant are the period, age, ar vintage 
effts  described at the outset in ecplainirg the differerre  between our 
results ard the ntid larger wage estimates  based on CPS type data sets? 16 
The question of whether air firdirqs can be gereralizal beyord the 
sarple relates to the  selertivity bias in stixlyirç establis￿ments 
that fa  organizing drives aid their clone petitors.  Stile it is 
catnr to think of selertivity bias in estinating the union wage effert in 
tens of the differenon  between the union prenitni orditi'nl a-i the 
ctserird union  (aM rxnmion)  sanpie aM the differential that ild result 
fran randan organization  of a set of 'air3cers or establisbeents, we do rot 
believe that this is the rest aseftil way  to pcse the prttlen.  ?That  is 
relevant  is rot what unionization nild do to a rardcrrJy chcsen 
establisftrent bit rather what it ',nild do to establishments with a 
reasonable chance of being unionizad  to fins clone to the rargin of 
being  oroanizef ratter than to the average  reninion establishment,  Th the 
extent that these 'tranginal'  fins mere clonely resetle the establishments 
in air sanple than the average rxriunion establiabnent,  an estimate of what 
unionism waild do to a rardrdy selertef fin waild provide a misleading 
picture of the rotential ef  fats of rev organizationS at  ore wants to 
?nna  is rot what uniceisan will do to ranflly doreen fires bit what it will 
do to fires for Mum unic'nisation is a reascrably prcteble event — that is, 
the impact of traiceisatice an establishment wages wei-xtef try the 
prdability of organization in the relevant seriaL  In an erwirorirrent where 
union organizing is infreguaot, we believe that air sample of establishrents 
ii likely to offer a closer proxy to the desired weightrd sample than a 
randan collation of fires,  The selativity pzthlen, then, is rot ore of 
correrting for the norirarrian retire of air sample bat rather diakirq 
whether there are differerces between the establishments that facod drives 
aid their cntçetitors that did ret that ini4it bias air estimate of the 17 
iact of uiaiisati.  We  examine the  issue in two ways.  First, 
estimate I  wall irasured variables  prior to the organizir drive prict 
whith establishnents face drives ard, onrditil cz the drive, hcw wall 
they prJ.ict the itccxt.  Srd, wa acd an inverse Mills rrtii  basa1 
<x the prthability of facii a drive to r  dwe in pay rressias ard 
examine its iirpact on r  estimates. 
Table 5 suimmarizes  c&ir analysis of the iqcact of wages ard benefits, 
personnel practis,  ard other variables before the union organizirq drive, 
anf organizin3 itcires.  l.rst 1 gives rraxirarn likelil estimates of a 
lit  eation that an establishaent has an ornizir drive  It s1-s that 
wages ar'd benefits do nat significantly af  feat the prbility of a drive, 
aiti that only seniority pr'/isicrs ard health wverage axxj personnel 
practices have discernible iscts.  preser of seniority tules raises 
the d-aixm  of a drive, ssibly use 'arkars in rmniicn firm  nat 
feel that supervisors apply the rule fairly, shile health coverage is also 
associated  with a higher prthability of an organizirq drive, for rx  arcarent 
reason.  (lnrrs 2  ard 3 suraarise the results of similar analysis of the 
daxies that, -ditianal on an eleation, uni ild  win,  ani, viitional 
on a win,  that they wmiid ciatain a omatract,  }Iere, wa loy a prortic.rai 
hazards exl (O1;Z1) 
=  .  (0) e(Z), where  (0) is an arbitrary 
unepecifie ase-lima hazard furction for continuocs 0, ard 0 is the evenr 
that an orqanizirq  ca!tpaign has taken place  (Lawless,  1982)  In coltssi 2 
cly cx variable is significant, the preser of a written grievazra 
prcceiure,  whicii rethx.es the iikeli1 of a uniaa win in an elertioru  Thh 
is istent with eiiderxe that 'peE3itive' laber relaticz relcoes chanres 
of union victories.  The fficients in colirnn 3 yield,  by trast, ro 18 
siificant inpact for any variable on the probability tt  a  firm 1d 
sige a tract.  Na-a of the cala.ilatior is sufficiently striid.r to 
sugest sericus selectivity bias pthlm in cur earlier analysis. 
still, we so.t to 'correct' cur results for sib1e selectivity bias 
by est1itir a probit variant of the colam 1 ation, 1culatirg ti 
inverse Mills ratio, ar a&th the term to cur wage rrsia. As we did 
not inc1e the existenoe of  practi in the wage rression, 
identification cat not only fran the non-linear funotional  form bit also 
fran the asrtion that personnel practi affect organizir drives bit 
not futhre wage increases.  The  L'werse Mills term did not enter the 
calculatione with a significant coefficient anI had only sllit effects an 
the estisetad coefficients on organizir cataories)0 14er, cur major 
firir — that the union wage effect is nuth ller  for neily unionizel 
fires than iit3icatai by the starxlard crs-section estimates  — is 
tmaffectal by this eonetric  probe. 
cur results versus  Cr  s-section sugg 
Axptir cur estimates as correct, what mit elain the differe 
in nagrütx3e betn then ard un.iaynoinion wage differentials fan. in CPS 
ard relat surveys? 
is that the differere reflects differers betn 
establisheent-bas ard idividual-bas amlyses, with establisnt-bas 
est±nates ller  1xcause establis-mnt  data control *tter for rkplaoe- 
relata wage differentials  that are rre1ate with unionism than 
irdividual-basad  data,  Aheent a detail investigation of union w 
effects  fran bith irdividual ard establisl-msnt scuxrs, we are unable to 19 
asss the itegiüte of this sibi1ity, txxh  do be1ive that it is of 
sate potential ixrtarx in e1ainir ar rei1ts. 
A secord pcssibility is that c*ir estint  union wage effects differ 
fran thcee in crtss-sectian stilies because of the tine rird  have 
ver,  To assess this, corider the differential diare in union ard 
rnunion wages  in the mid  1980s  as reported in &reau of taher Statisti' 
r1rertt  Crat Irdex:  these data sh that fran 1983 to 1986 naation 
of union rrkrs Lreased  by 15.6% crpared to 20.4%  for onnunion workers, 
reucirx3 the union preniun by pexhape 5 perrentage points.11  ffl 
short of the  15 to 20  percentage  point differential betn c*r estimated 
03-.04 in point union wage  effect arid  crces-sectian union wage gapo, 
believe that ttile pericd effts are inpjrtant in e1ainLrq the 
differerc,  they are riit the whole story. 
A third psthi1ity are  effects,  As riothirg in cxtr analysis 
of the factors that caused crrizirg drives ror of selectivity bias in wage 
rress  ices  indicated that the firrs facirq drives ware markedly different 
than their carpetitors, wa do rot believe cedort effects are that  irportarit 
in explairdrq cr results,  2erhas inion organizirq in the 1980s  was 
tivated by the sama  uateneired earegetent treatrent of workers that 
industrial relaticrs stidies fci.ud to have caused s.nressftl unionization in 
other porieds of tire (Rees ,p.26) rather than by any special  cchert effect. 
A fc*irth sibiity is that age or first contract effects eqlain nxth 
of the differeroe between air estimates of the inpact of unionization  on 
wages  aM those in CPS-type crcas-'section rcaressicxE.  ile  we lack direct 
evideroe on this point, the cons  isteroy of cur firidirge with those on the 
effects of teacher uniaüsation on r.ily onpnizei sd1 districts is 20 
certainly estive of first contract effects.  firir that r  union 
organization had substantial effects on rn—wage srkir itia-  but net 
on wages ard benefits also seers to paint in this direction.  ent  data on 
future wage settlenents in ar sanpie, hver,  cannet detarnilne t 
ntagnitue of the first contract effect, 
Onnelusion 
This paper has presentrd the results of a survey of 364  establishitents 
covering over 146,000 Jrkers, sate of &n fa  union organizirg drives 
during the 1980s ani sate of wIzn did net face suth drives.  Cur data shcws 
that firns that icet elections to unions ard sigr collective contracts 
inercasel  wages  ard benefits ircre rapidly than cttro1 fints but fell far 
short of the gains  nee3.ed to readi the 15%-25% union wage prnit faird in 
s-section stzxiles.  Cur data also s  that t  newly orgenizad srkers 
thtaine substantial "voice" benefits xti as grievar prcoeures ard 
seniority provisi-s,  while epariering declines in enploynent carparei to 
control fire,  ?  hyçcthesize that the susil wage effects that  fcurxi are 
likely to reflect 'çericz' effects due to the enic environnent of the 
1980s ard 'first otract' effects due to the terercy of new union 
orgenizati to use their bargainir r  to etharce irustria1 dracy 
ani decision-ma3drg  by titles rather than to raise wages ard y  also reflect 
differers in the estinati size of union wage prnium between 
establishaerxt ari irdividual rker data sets. 21 
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1.  Estimates fr  Qrrent Waqe  Develc*vents fr  the BLS for Jam.ary 1987 
shew that for the pericd 1981-1986 uni  wage rates grew an average of 
4.4 er year thile rziuni wages irreaseI an average of 5 percent per 
year. 
2.  In virthally all iroiels of ui-iion kavior iireases  in the elasticity 
of the denard for laher rthx uni  wage gair, 
3.  N1y orniz fthr will enonter an aãitticzal "shk' ensation 
efft d  to both higher direct iaor costs (e.g. wii  wage prenium) 
ard the irdirect osts of a grievar prure, written pstir etc. 
Therefore, the rly oriiz firm may experiei an ac'diticzial  r1ti  in ployxnant relative to existin umia estab1is1-nts  wbo 
have borne these extra labor/personnel costs in prevics peris ard  r  face cfly izxreases in neotiatad wages in the .irrent rard. of 
rctiatia. re  formally, i  wild expect that  W>  W where 
is the wage dare in rJly orniz estab1ishnts to greater 
than  where  is the wage dange in newly orgenize estab1isnts. 
4.  states in c*ir sanpie that had  NIRB e1ectict data irx1 Arkansas,  tiit,  Ia, l<sas,  Maine, Massadaisetts,  Misscuri, Nraska, 
New Hançshire, ard Vert. 
5.  In this cse we cal1e a rann grcip of 80 riuü  cxIp3nies that had  r  NIRB electi, in the sane irdustry ard area that were in bosiness 
in the sas year as the NLRB  election cxvpany.  If the  firm was r 23 
lcrer in bosiness e asked a ll  oititor whether the firm that 
ciceed had a union present or had an NLRB e1tion durirq the period of 
interest.  If the arsr to both qtior  was rx  it was counted as 
havirzg  ciceed for prpses of r  xzitrol stixy. 
6.  There are two different raticles for trollirg for the initial wage 
in these calculatiors, hase en t  different  rderlyir structural mels. 
The first  is a ragress  ion to nean txxel in whidi '  assae that 
establisirrents axve or belov the average  wage terd to have ircreases that, 
all else the saire, brir then toward the irean  The secord nrxlel derives the 
c±are equation  frau an iaticn relatir the level of wages to the v&±or 
of ireasured variables ard an ur±servable,  Then  one cbtairs diares in 
wages by subtractirej  the level ation in an earlier ried fren the level 
atien in t.  If the ur±servable has the sane efft over tine, the 
reiltant tharqe atien does rt  centain the earlier peried wage.  If the 
effert of the uexvable  dvinges over tire, it does contain the earlier 
ric  wage as a  right-hard  side variable,  In this case it is recessaxy  to 
do a bit of  ritetric to cbtain censistent estlirates, as wa report later 
in fcotrrte 7.  Sea Fran (l. 
7. For a reller sale of 160 establists  sre also able to examine 
wages three years prior to the eltion.  Rsgressincj real wages 3 years 
prior en ir  &miwf variables for organizir cateqor.j ard trols  yielded 
the folldr estinates  (staiaxd errors)  of the relation between future 
ornizir activity aM these wages:  union wirs eltien aM gairs tract: 
—.01(.02);  union wins el&tien bit does rt  gain itract: .04(.03);  onion 
leses eltion:  —.00 (.01).  there açears to he ne stxt* relation 
between wages three years earlier aM organizirq entcs. 24 
8.  Spific2lly, s  regresses the wage level one year before the drive on 
the wage level three years before ard the other variables in the uation 
anzl us  the prilcte  value as the ctro1 for wage level  in the rress  ion 
for daxes in wages fron one year before to one year after,  This alls 
for the sibility that tJ lage wage term will be orrelatei with the 
residual in the charxe ation, as inp1i by the sexrxl xdel descrihai in 
ftrote 6.  The irsti-unenting eliminates this tential sar of bias. 
9.  We  also catçared changes in iloyirerit in firs that fac organizir 
drives with the dwges in their pairs.  Cue th the nrber of fintE that did 
rt  repDrt esploynent there were just 62 suth thservatia', making the 
results suspect,  Still, these calculatior showel a patterm similar to that 
in table 5, with plants in whidi unions  wen a irntract experiencing leeses 
of ploynnt relative to their pair, ard these in whid unicns won an 
election but ild net gain a xz-itract also sdng relative declines in 
loyment.  ly  the grxip  in which unions lost the election did net s1 
th a pattern. 
10.  In partia.ilar,  for the rression of ctiange in wages one year rior to 
the drive to the a,irrent peri, the estirretrd inpacts  (stardard errors) of 
otanizirg categories was:  .mion wins citract,  .03]. (.027); union wir 
election bit fails to gain tract, .00 (.03);  union loses election, 
.04(.02). 
11. These changes are fron C  1982 to C  1986.  Union ca'tpeneation rose 
nre rapidly than nonunion ccziperation  prior to 1983.  See U.S.  3ireau of 
Labor Statistios, News, iploymant Cost Irdex, quarterly. TABLE  1: 
Estimates  of the Impact  of OrganizIng Activity 
on Establishment  Wages  and Benefits 
Regression Coef— 
Category & Nc.  Wage  & Benefit  Levels in  ficients for in 
of Establish-  1977  Constant Dollars  in 1977  Constant 
merits (N)  (Standard  Leviation)  Dollar Wages 
lyrbe-  lyrbe- 
1 year  1 year  at the  fore  to 1  fore  to 
before  after  time of  yr after  the  time 
election  election  survey  election  of survey 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Unir Jiitns  a  rta-" 
tratt  Cflt5t/ 
N  33  $  5.45  $  5.47  $  5.47  .03  .04 
(2.2,  (.ba)  (1.72)  (.01;  '.01) 
Untc,  gins  clot-' 
tic:;  to tontract 
(No  Ccntract) 
N = 21  $  5.56  $  5.39  $  5.50  .01  .02 
(1.01)  (2.14)  (2.15)  (.02)  (.02) 
Union loses electic 
(Loses  Election) 
N = 80  $  5.75  $  5.72  $  r.82  .01  .03 
(1.78;  '1.70)  '1.73;  (.01)  (.01, 
Noor7soi  zirg 
drive  No Drive; 
N  109  $  5.61  $  5.46  $  5.26 
'1.80)  (1.71)  1.66; 
24 
Notes:  Stancord errors  sac  parertoc 
Regressions ioc]ude  controls  for  es one year  before 
election  rg1on,  hat-er w'rkr.  arc proLction wor- 
kers or not ana dJmOieS fr year of  electIon. 
The  sarplea ar"  rest r  ot/ to  c-r o estat I as' cents 
who  reportet  wave  scd  benefit  levels  refor€  ,od  after 
the election  and  at  Ste  S  'to  of tha sorvey TABLE  2: 
Estimates  of Differences  in Change of Log 
Real  Wages for  an Establishment  from  its Pair 






























Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The sample size for calculations  is 62 pairs or 124 
establishments. 
Regressions include controls for region  and the dif- 
ferences in wages one yoar before the election. 
Changes in in wages and 
benefits in establishments 
facing organizing  drives 
minus changes in its pair 
Regression  Coefficient f  or 
impact of organizing outcomes 
on log change in wages and 
benefits relative to its pair TABLE 3: 
Estimates  of the Impact  of Organizing 
Activity on Personnel  Practices 
(1) 
CR1  EVANCE 
PRCCE'Y 5  ______ 
Contract  .38 
No C'ntract  .-,6 
oson P1cc.  .43 
No  ,tlio  .43 
N2:1N ."NI,P— 
ITY  4?  ill >tN 
Contract  .43 
No Cantract  .39 
Loso. Eec.  53 




.23  174 
(.62) 
.18  1.64 
(.71) 







(  Rn%  —'"i 
PRCFIT SHARING  ______ 
Contract  .36  .24  — 4?  —.21  —1.60 
(1,80) 
No Contract  .57  .08  11  06  —.92 
(1.  IC)  Loses Elec.  .55  .63  08  .02  —.66 
(.53) 
No Drive  .43  51  .08  —  — 
Notes?  Standa'4  t-crcc-s  ace  in parentsescs,  Ingis-ir e'c4tions 
inorcded, 
Regressions  incrade  controls  for region, vegas  one year  before the  election,  dummies  for year of  electon, 
and  atdther wo:ktrs  are :rod'ooton wor$rs  or not 
Sample Sise =  364, 
Personnel  Logit Coeff. 
practices  pence  of Pract  in  for impact 
& organ—  1 year  1 year  in  practice  of organiz— 
izing  before  after  practice  vs.  ing activity 
activity  election  election  (2-1)  in pair  on practice 
(2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
.48  .35  3.09 
(.58) 
:8  —.06  .52  .64 
nO  17 
.o8 
.28 
.11  .32 
63 
.36  .05 
WRI4?t-N  4?S4?N 
OF  Pt-.  - 
Ccnt. a-st 
No  Cortrac' 
Loses Elec 
NC,  Crive 
66  .26  .24 
75  4?  —.13 
76  09 
.51  .08 
— .0_s TABLE  4: 
Estimates of the Impact  of Union Activity 
on Establishment  Employment Change 
Mean L  in  in Employ- 
ment:  date of elec- 
tion to date of survey 
Regression coefficients 
for in  in employment: 
date of election to current 
Category (#  of  estab— 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
Regressions include  controls for region (Boston  or KC.) 
wage levels  on year before  the election, occupation,  and 
year in which the election  was  held. 
(1)  (2) 
Contract 





N = 15 
—.08  —.13 
(.04) 
Loses Election 
N =  119 
.01  —.06 
.03 
No  Drive 
N = 118 
.07 29 
TABLE  5: 
Maximum Likelihood  Estimates 
of Organizing  Category Outcomes 
Having an Organ-  Losing to  Signing a 
Drive  Union  Contract 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Logistic  Hazard  Hazard 
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  CoeffIcient 












Prior All Heath  .54  .50  —1.23 
Wage i year  pri— 
or to election 







Notes.  Star dart errL are i  parenthesas. 
All  regreosiuns Include controls for written posting  or 
prcrotor oppcrturltLes, gension plan,  relocation as- 
sIstance,  severance  pay.  funeral leave,  military or 
jury duty,  for region, and  fur whether wcryers were 
prodct1On  or not 